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H I G H L I G H T S 
• The continuous traded volumes in the Iberian power futures market grow steadily. 
• Those volumes are correlated to OTC volumes and the enrolment of key players. 
• Most liquid contracts show the smallest hedging ratio. 
• Regulation fixing the coal fired generation price affects spot and forward prices. 
• The overall efficiency can grow via market monitoring reports and OTC data access. 
A B S T R A C T 
The efficiency of the Iberian Energy Derivatives Market in its first five and a half years is assessed in 
terms of volume, open interest and price. The continuous market shows steady liquidity growth. 
Its volume is strongly correlated to that of the Over The Counter (OTC) market, the amount of market 
makers, the enrolment of financial agents and generation companies belonging to the integrated group 
of last resort suppliers, and the OTC cleared volume in its clearing house. The hedging efficiency, 
measured through the ratio between the final open interest and the cleared volume, shows the lowest 
values for the Spanish base load futures as they are the most liquid contracts. The ex-post forward risk 
premium has diminished due to the learning curve and the effect of the fixed price retributing the 
indigenous coal fired generation. This market is quite less developed than the European leaders 
headquartered in Norway and Germany. Enrolment of more traders, mainly international energy 
companies, financial agents, energy intensive industries and renewable generation companies 
is desired. Market monitoring reports by the market operator providing post-trade transparency, OTC 
data access by the energy regulator, and assessment of the regulatory risk can contribute to 
efficiency gains. 
1. Introduction 
This research analyses the efficiency of the Iberian Energy 
Derivatives Market, the power futures market managed by OMIP 
("Iberian Market Operator, Portuguese Pool"), by means of the 
evolution of three key indicators: (i) the traded volumes (reflect-
ing the liquidity development); (ii) the open interest (reflecting 
the trading behaviour, as it shows the net positions of OMIP 
trading members, i.e. the amount of futures contracts that may be 
used for hedging against the volatility and uncertainty of the 
underlying spot price); and (iii) the ex-post forward risk premium 
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(reflecting the price efficiency). This market started operating on 
July 3, 2006. The derivatives data set considers the first five and a 
half years (i.e. traded volumes until December 31, 2011). 
The evolution of the Spanish electricity market in the last 
months has been influenced by the introduction of new regula-
tion. Section 2 provides a snapshot of the Spanish electricity 
policy influencing the wholesale power market. This section is 
focused on the main measures affecting the performance of the 
electricity forward market. The evolution of the traded volumes in 
the power futures market compared to the rest of existing 
forward contracting mechanisms is presented in Section 3. The 
analysis of the open interest and its relation to the traded 
volumes is shown in Section 4. The evolution of the ex-post 
forward risk premium is tracked in Section 5. Section 6 provides 
policy considerations derived from the analyses performed in the 
previous sections with the aim of contributing to higher efficiency 
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Fig. 1. Evolution of the Spanish prompt year ("Y+1") base load power futures settlement price versus the underlying spot price, the French base load power futures 
settlement price and the forward GTCC generation costs (e/MWh). 
Sources: OMIP-OMIClear, OMIE, EEX, Platts and ICE, adapted by authors. 
levels. Section 7 summarises all the findings, suggests further 
lines of research and concludes. 
2. The current electricity policy context 
2.1. The subsidised coal fired generation with indigenous coal 
The Royal Decree 134/2010, of 12 February, 2010, compelling 
the Spanish coal power plants to burn indigenous coal at a 
regulated price for the sake of security of supply, in force on 
February 26, 2011, fixes the generation costs of 10 coal power 
plants. For year 2011, the variable cost of the coal plant with 
biggest production is around 53 €/MWh, being the weighted 
average price of the 10 plants, according to their maximum 
allowed volumes, equal to 55.30 €/MWh. As a consequence, this 
policy measure sets a price threshold in the merit order curve of 
the spot market (MITyC, 2010, 2011a). As indicated in CNE 
(2012a), this mechanism produced in the second quarter of year 
2011 a smoother merit order curve in the day ahead market. It 
reduced the peak price and increased the off-peak price, disap-
pearing the price signal needed for the efficient consumption. As 
the day ahead market became more expensive, the suppliers not 
belonging to the incumbents purchased in year 2011 the major 
part of their energy in the subsequent intra-day markets. These 
markets, composed of 6 sequential auctions, resulted in average 
in year 2011 1.7€/MWh cheaper than the day-ahead market. 
From August 2011, the prices in the day ahead market increased 
due to more expensive offers of Gas Turbine Combined Cycles 
(GTCC). This was caused by higher Iberian gas prices, motivated 
by a larger demand of liquefied natural gas by Japan, in the 
aftermath of Fukushima nuclear accident. Therefore, in the second 
half of year 2011, the Spanish spot price was more expensive—with 
the exception of November—than in the main European power 
markets (Nord Pool (Nordic countries) and European Power 
Exchange "EPEX" (France, Germany, Austria and Switzerland)). 
The following subsection analyses the main drivers of the 
Spanish electricity forward price formation and the impact of the 
Royal Decree 134/2010. 
2.1.1. The impact of the recognised price of the indigenous coal fired 
generation in the Spanish forward price formation 
The GTCC generation accounts in Spain in 2009 for 24.2% of the 
installed capacity and for 29% of the electricity gross generation, 
being the main technology in the generation mix (Moreno and 
Martinez-Val, 2011). However, due to the effect of the recognised 
price for the coal fired generation with indigenous coal, the GTCC 
production passed from 63 TWh in year 2010 to 50TWh in year 
2011 (the load factor, obtained as the ratio between the equiva-
lent working hours and the total amount of hours in a year, 
diminished from 30% to 22%) (CNE, 2012a). The Spanish electricity 
forward prices are influenced by the spot prices, the fuel 
prices—especially the gas prices—and the international electricity 
forward prices (Villaplana and Cartea, 2011). Fig. 1 shows the 
evolution of the Spanish prompt year base load futures contract, 
compared to the underlying spot price (OMIE1 spot price), the 
French prompt year base load futures contract traded in the 
European Energy Exchange (EEX), and the forward estimation of 
the GTCC generation costs. Monthly average values are used for 
each energy price. The settlement price of the Spanish prompt 
year power futures stabilises around 53 €/MWh since March 2011 
influenced by the entry in force of Royal Decree 134/2010. 
Table 1 shows high correlation coefficients of the Spanish 
prompt year base load power futures price with the GTCC 
generation cost, the French prompt year base load power futures 
price, and the Spanish power spot price. 
The clean spark spread is obtained as the difference between 
the Spanish power futures price and the forward GTCC generation 
cost taking into account the C02 emission rates (e.g. Abadie and 
Chamorro, 2009). For the gas prices, Platts assessments of prompt 
year base load forward contract traded OTC ("Over The Counter", 
i.e. out of organised markets) in the Dutch virtual trading point 
(TTF, "Title Transfer Facility") are used. The Spanish gas market 
lacks of price transparency, as physical swaps for balancing 
purposes are arranged amongst participants without disclosing 
the price (Honore, 2011; CNE, 2012b). Therefore a liquid reference 
in continental Europe has been taken instead. For the C02 
1
 OMIE stands for "Iberian Market Operator, Spanish Pool" 
Table 1 
Correlation coefficients of the Spanish prompt year base load power futures 
settlement price with the underlying spot price, the French prompt year power 
futures and the forward GTCC Generation Costs. 
Sources: OMIP-OMIClear, OMIE, EEX, Platts and ICE, adapted by authors. 
Prompt year forward GTCC generation costs 0.94 
French power prompt year futures price 0.87 
Spanish power spot price 0.82 
emissions, European Union Allowances (EUA) futures settlement 
prices in the Inter Continental Exchange (ICE) are considered. The 
GTCC generation cost is calculated as the sum of the gas forward 
price, divided by the thermal efficiency of the power plant, and 
the price of the C02 allowance multiplied by the emission rate. As 
in Abadie and Chamorro (2009), a thermal efficiency of 55% and a 
emission rate of 0.371 C02/MWh are employed. As shown in 
Fig. 1, in the majority of the months, the clean spark spreads are 
positive (generation profits). There are some periods with nega-
tive spreads (second and third quarters of 2008 and 2011). 
The Spanish prompt year futures price tends to be smaller than 
the neighbouring French power futures price. There are only few 
months with Spanish futures prices bigger than French ones, 
being the price difference smaller than in the opposite case. 
During year 2011, the Spanish price exceeds more often the 
French price influenced by the price level bound to Royal Decree 
134/2010. 
The Spanish prompt year futures price tends to be higher than 
the underlying spot price ("contango"). However, in year 2008, 
the spot price was often bigger than the futures price, especially 
in the second half of the year ("backwardation"). At that time, the 
futures prices were influenced by downward prognoses due to the 
global financial turmoil. During year 2011, the Spanish spot and 
futures prices present smaller differences influenced by the price 
level set by Royal Decree 134/2010. 
2.2. The moratorium to renewables 
The deployment of renewable energy sources in the last 20 years 
has been outstanding in Spain (Moreno and Martinez-Val, 2011). 
However, the Royal Decree-Law 1/2012 freezes temporarily the grant 
of new feed-in tariff contracts to contain the large tariff deficit, as a 
portion of this deficit is caused by large incentives to the renewable 
energy sources. For instance, the market premium to solar technol-
ogies in 2010 exceeded 2000 million € (MINETUR 2012a). This Royal 
Decree-Law could affect negatively about 4500 MW and 550 MW of 
wind and solar photovoltaic power projects respectively, as well as 
other special regime (renewables and cogeneration) projects (Energy 
Market Price, 2012). Nonetheless, a significant amount of renewable 
generation (ca. 11,000 MW) officially registered at the entry into force 
of the Royal Decree-Law can be installed, not being affected by the 
moratorium (Ordonez, 2012). Garcia Breva (2012) warns about the 
regulatory risk damaging the development of Spanish renewable 
energy sources, due to continuous changes in the special regime 
regulation. After the entry into force of the key regulation (Royal 
Decree 661/2007, of 25 May, 2007, regulating the special regime 
production), a new Decree has been introduced every six months 
generating uncertainty to investors. 
The effects of maintaining this moratorium should be analysed 
cautiosly by policy makers, due to the effect of the renewable 
energy sources in diminishing the C02 emissions of the genera-
tion mix and the reduction of spot prices. Gelabert et al. (2011) 
study ex-post the effects of special regime generation on Spanish 
wholesale electricity prices, with data for years 2005-2009. They 
find that a marginal increase of 1 GWh of special regime 
generation is associated with a reduction of ca. 4% in wholesale 
power prices. 
The special regime power plants profiting of a feed-in-tariff 
scheme can sell the electricity at a fixed price. Those installations 
affected by Royal Decree-Law 1/2012 may now be interested in 
hedging their production in the futures market or OTC. 
2.3. The extension of life cycle of power plants 
Whereas the GTCC and renewable sources in Spain are quite 
modern, as they have mainly been installed in the last 20 years, the 
nuclear plants—built in the nuclear boom of the 70s and 80s—and 
the coal power plants are older. Continuous debate is created about 
the extension or closure of the ageing Spanish nuclear plants. No 
new nuclear power plants are envisaged. Such new investments are 
surrounded of several uncertainties (Linares and Conchado, 2010). 
The effects on power prices due to the extension of life cycle of 
power plants are different depending on the generation technology. 
In the case of nuclear power plants, the extension produces smaller 
spot and forward prices, due to the base load nature of this 
technology. On the other hand, SensfuIS et al. (2008) detect that 
the extension of life cycle of old thermal power plants (coal and fuel 
oil) creates upward price pressure in the wholesale power prices 
due to higher inefficiency of such aged plants. 
2.3.2. The effect of the German nuclear moratorium on power prices 
After the Fukushima nuclear disaster on March 11, 2011, the 
German government discussed the shutdown of nuclear power by 
2022. This moratorium was officially announced on March 14, 
2011, stopping 7 nuclear reactors (5.3 GW). On May 21, 2011, the 
German government decided to shut down progressively all the 
nuclear reactors by 2022. The German power market joined the 
Trilateral Coupling in the Central West European Region—formed 
by the French, Belgian, and Dutch markets—on November 9, 
2010. The market coupling algorithm provides a unique spot 
price in the region in the absence of congestion in the inter-
connection. Therefore their price spreads (both spot and futures) 
diminished with the introduction of the algorithm. However, the 
German moratorium has produced a smaller spot price conver-
gence between the German and French prices (the French prices 
were 1.8 €/MWh cheaper in the first half of year 2011) and the 
inversion in the price level of the year futures (the German 
forward prices have become more expensive) (CRE, 2011). 
2.4. The mitigation of large cost deficits in the electricity sector 
2.4.1. Policy recommendations by the National Regulatory Authority 
The Spanish national regulatory authority CNE (2012b) indi-
cates the existence of a structural deficit in the Spanish electricity 
sector since a decade, as the recognised costs for regulated 
activities have been (and are) higher than the incomes from 
regulated prices paid by consumers. The deficit at March 6, 2012, 
reckons 21,812 million € (23,312 million € including the estab-
lished deficit for year 2012). In order to tackle this deficit, CNE 
(2012b) suggests short term (i.e. urgent) measures, as the cost 
review of regulated activities and the delay of planned invest-
ments, the utilities' cession of part of the generated debt to third 
parties, the pass through of the System Operator's retribution and 
the large consumers' interruption cost (they would be considered 
as energy costs rather than access costs), the charge of the 
capacity availability payments and generation investment incen-
tives on the market participants instead of the consumers, the 
elimination of the financing of the insular costs by the mainland 
power system, the financing of feed-in tariff costs through the 
incomes of the C02 auctions, and the temporary lamination of the 
premiums for the concentrating solar power plants already 
registered but still not working. As medium term measures, CNE 
(2012b) suggests to review the unit costs and the asset retribu-
tion basis (i.e. update of the incentive based regulation), the 
attribution to the CNE—instead of the Ministry of Industry—for 
establishing the methodology of retribution of the regulated 
activities, and the introduction of renewable auctions. 
2.4.2. The first measures taken by the government 
The Royal Decree-Law 13/2012, of 30 March, diminishes the 
costs in the electricity and gas systems. It aims that the third 
party access rates are sufficient to cover the regulated costs, 
taking into account the foreseen ex-ante deficit for 2012. The 
following measures stated in this Royal Decree-Law may affect 
the performance of the electricity forward market: (i) The capa-
city payments2 are reduced 80 million € (this can produce higher 
spot prices in the peak hours, increasing the forward risk 
premium embedded in the forward prices; in this sense, the risk 
premia increase when the generators' profits are less 
stable (Fabra, 2009)); (ii) the retribution to the interruption 
services by large consumers will be reduced 60 million € (such 
consumers may now be incentivised to contract instead firm 
services, producing an upward pressure in the spot and forward 
prices; additionally, a bigger demand on firm services may 
produce a change in the energy tariff cost structure to reflect this 
need properly); (iii) the recognised payments to the coal fired 
generation with indigenous coal will be limited to 50 million € 
(the reduction of recognised incomes to older coal plants may 
increase the spot and forward prices, in line with SensfulS et al. 
(2008)) (MINETUR, 2012b, 2012c). 
Regarding the neighbouring country, the Portuguese govern-
ment also envisages immediate energy policy reforms. Those 
measures will also focus on strict control of the energy systems 
costs in a first phase, followed by their reduction in a second 
phase. For instance, the state costs related to the supervision of 
the electricity and gas concessions will have to be paid by the 
consumers through the end-user tariffs (Cabral, 2012). 
2.5. The introduction of household hourly tariffs 
As indicated by CNE (2012b) and MINETUR (2012b), a review 
of the cost components is needed to ensure that the Third Party 
Access rates cover the costs of the electricity sector. Additionally 
to this, changes in the domestic end-user tariffs are needed to 
take into account the benefits of smart grids and smart meters, 
helping to a massive demand response that increases the effi-
ciency of the whole power system (Conchado and Linares, 2010). 
Moreno (2011) indicates that hourly rates and smart meters are 
widely used by large consumers since the liberalisation of the 
electricity sector in 2008. Such a research detects the positive 
effect of liberalisation correcting inefficient trends of electricity 
demand in Spain. Time-of-use tariffs for household consumption 
would be adequate if such prices are not set by the government 
(e.g. for consumers with power exceeding 2 kW) and they are 
liberalised. The gradual introduction of smart meters in 25 
millions of households (i.e. power less than 15 kW) in Spain, as 
envisaged by the Plan of meters substitution, has not become a 
reality yet. This plan should be completed by 2018 (MITyC, 
2009b). Cabeza (2011) indicates that in 2014 half of those meters 
would be installed and the remote system would be working. 
2
 A regulated payment for the generation plants providing capacity. It 
includes 2 services: the long term investment incentive and the medium term 
generation availability. The CNE is currently assessing the introduction of a 
capacity market mechanism to streamline this issue (CNE, 2012a, 2012b). 
Regulatory developments establishing a national plan for active 
management of the power demand are needed to take full 
advantage of these devices. The major Spanish utilities have 
developed pilot projects of smart grids in cities where their 
distribution companies have installed smart meters. Joskow and 
Wolfram (2011) indicate that the introduction of time-varying 
electricity prices for households in the US is slow despite of 
decreasing device costs and improved functionality for meters 
and automated demand response technologies. They think that 
most utilities will begin offering alternative tariffs while leaving 
flat-rate pricing the default option. 
The massive deployment of dynamic pricing of electricity can 
reduce the price spikes. The price differences between peak and 
off-peak periods would then fall. Therefore, average spot prices 
would decrease as well as the forward risk premium. 
3. Evolution of the trading efficiency 
The trading efficiency of the Iberian energy derivatives market 
is analysed according to its main structural features. First, its 
volume development is compared with the rest of existing 
forward market mechanisms. Its concentration basic figures are 
compared with those of the generation and supply activities. The 
key trading drivers of OMIP continuous market are identified. 
Additionally, this futures market is compared with the main 
European benchmarks. 
3.1. Volume comparison between Iberian forward trading 
mechanisms 
The evolution of OMIP traded volumes has to be seen in 
conjunction with the dominant non-organised OTC market—in 
Spain, financial trading either done bilaterally or with the inter-
mediation of brokers, being a portion of them cleared and settled 
through clearing houses—and with the volumes matched in the 
regulated auctions for the Spanish last resort supplies ("CESUR" 
auctions3). Although the first CESUR auction was celebrated in 
June 2007, covering part of the regulated supplies by the dis-
tribution companies, the last resort supplies—managed by new 
companies, the so-called "last resort suppliers" belonging to the 
same vertical group of those distribution companies—substituted 
such regulated supplies since July 1, 2009, according to Royal 
Decree 485/2009 (MITyC, 2009a). 
Fig. 2 shows the evolution of the cleared and settled volumes 
(in TWh) in OMIClear (OMIP clearing house), and the matched 
volumes in CESUR auctions. It additionally shows the cleared 
volumes in another clearing house (MEFF Power), which started 
operation on March 21, 2011, for the clearing and settlement of 
OTC power trades with Spanish underlying spot prices. MEFF 
stands in Spanish for "Spanish Financial Futures Market" (BME, 
2011; MEFF, 2011). 
There are two market modes in OMIP: the continuous market 
and auctions. Whereas the former is the main mode, the latter has 
performed a key role in the development of the liquidity in OMIP, 
as the Spanish distribution companies and the Portuguese last 
resort supplier were obliged to purchase energy in such auctions 
until July 2009 and July 2010 respectively (Capitan Herraiz and 
Rodriguez Monroy, 2009). Furthermore OMIClear permits the 
clearing and settlement of OTC volumes by OMIP trading mem-
bers, either bilaterally or through one of the four registered 
brokers. In the period June 2007-December 2011, 17 CESUR 
auctions have been celebrated sourcing part of the last resort 
3
 "CESUR" stands in Spanish for "Energy Contracts for the Last Resort Supply". 
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Fig. 2. Evolution of traded and cleared volumes in OMIP-OMIClear, traded volumes in CESUR auctions, and cleared volumes in MEFF Power (TWh). 
Sources: OMIP-OMIClear (2011), CESUR (2011), MEFF (2011). 
supplies. The last resort suppliers purchase the remaining part in 
the spot market. Prior to each CESUR auction, they have to 
communicate to the Ministry of Industry their load forecast. Since 
March 2011, they hedge the part of their forecast not covered by 
the CESUR auction at the same equilibrium price by means of a 
contract for differences mechanism regulated by Royal Decree 
302/2011. The counterparties are the special regime facilities 
selling their energy in the spot market (day ahead and intra-day 
auctions) and receiving a fixed price ("regulated rate"). As the 
equilibrium prices of the CESUR auctions are usually bigger than 
the underlying spot price, the rents obtained from this mechan-
ism help to mitigate the part of the tariff deficit generated by the 
regulated rate recognised to such special regime facilities (CESUR 
2011; MITyC, 2011b). 
OMIP traded volumes in the first two years—i.e. from July 
2006 to June 2008—were led by compulsory auctions. Since that 
moment until the end of 2009 the continuous volumes reached a 
similar size to the auction ones. Afterwards, the continuous 
market volumes kept growing. During 2010, the scarce auction 
volumes were generated by compulsory auctions of peak futures 
for the Portuguese last resort supplier. OMIP peak futures are still 
very illiquid. The month with record of continuous volumes was 
March 2011 (4.86 TWh). The OTC cleared volumes also reached a 
record in that month (5.68 TWh) and maintained a growing trend, 
influenced by the strong OTC trading development (OMIP-
OMIClear, 2011). 
Since March 21, 2011, OTC power trades with Spanish under-
lying spot prices can also be cleared and settled by MEFF Power. 
Although the number of enroled members in MEFF Power is 
growing fast (25 at the end of December 2011, of which 13 are 
also active in OMIP, which has 38 members at that date4) the 
registered volumes until the end of December 2011 are still small 
(3.8 TWh) compared to the OTC registered volumes in OMIClear 
in the same period (24.5 GWh) (MEFF, 2011; OMIP-OMIClear, 
2011). 
Table 2 shows the traded volumes in OMIP, in CESUR auctions 
and OTC, as well as the cleared and settled OTC volumes in the 
4
 On the other hand, Alba Rios and Moreda Diaz (2010) indicate that the 
Spanish OTC market is composed of around 25 players (gas and power companies, 
financial entities, large consumers and commodity traders). The number of 
participants in the CESUR auctions is around 30 (CNE, 2011a). 
2 clearing houses. Additionally, it shows the Spanish mainland 
demand at busbar. Values for year 2011, year 2010, and the whole 
period covered by this research Quly 2006-December 2011) are 
provided. The traded volumes in OMIP (auction and continuous), 
CESUR auctions, and OTC grow in year 2011 compared to year 
2010. Conversely, the OTC registered volumes in OMIClear and 
the demand diminish in year 2011. The CESUR volumes are only 
7% bigger than OMIP continuous volumes in that year. The OTC 
market has experienced a steady growing trend, summing up in 
the whole period ca. 863 TWh. The first two years in which the 
OTC volumes are bigger than the demand (i.e. a "churn" ratio5 
bigger than 1) are the years 2010 and 2011. The accumulated OTC 
volumes are 10.3 times bigger than OMIP continuous volumes 
and 4.5 times bigger than CESUR matched volumes. Only a minor 
part of the whole OTC volume is centrally cleared: 10.4% by 
OMIClear and 1.4% by MEFF Power (OMIP-OMIClear, 2011; MEFF, 
2011; CESUR, 2011; Intermoney, 2012; REE, 2012). 
3.2. Competition in the power futures market 
According to the futures market operator, this market became 
less concentrated during year 2010 and the market share of the 
three biggest players accounted for 40% in the last months of 
2010 (OMIP, 2011). This share compares well against the genera-
tion and supply concentration, according to 2010 figures: in 
Spain, the 3 largest generators' market share, based on the 
installed capacity, covers around 59%. In the Spanish electricity 
retail market, discarding the last resort supplies, the market 
shares of the 3 biggest companies add up to 74% in energy and 
90% in customers (CNE, 2011a). 
3.3. Key trading drivers in OMIP continuous market 
Correlation analysis of the traded volumes in OMIP continuous 
market during each month serves to identify key trading drivers 
for such a market. The correlation coefficients of those drivers are 
shown in Table 3, namely: the OTC volumes, OMIP market makers 
active at each moment (in December 2011, 4 market makers 
provided quotations for prompt month, quarter, and year base 
See e.g. Ofgem (2009). 
load futures contracts with the spot price of the Spanish zone as 
underlying price), the enrolment of financial agents, the enrol-
ment of generation companies belonging to the integrated group 
of the last resort supplier and the OTC volumes cleared and 
settled by OMIClear. 
3.4. Comparison with the most developed European exchanges 
Despite of the steady development in terms of members and 
cleared volumes in the Iberian power futures market, its figures 
are still far from the most mature European energy derivatives 
exchanges (Nasdaq OMX Commodities—traditionally known as 
Nord Pool, headquartered in Norway—and EEX—headquartered 
in Germany). Table 4 shows the traded volumes and OTC 
registered volumes, as well as the number of participants in the 
three exchanges in the year 2011, compared to the previous year. 
Due to OMIP emerging nature, it is the only exchange showing in 
year 2011 bigger total cleared volumes and members compared to 
year 2010. The smaller total cleared volumes in EEX in year 2011 are 
due to the uncertain trading environment, in which traders prefer 
shorter term maturities (EEX, 2012a). Both the German and Nordic 
markets present quite larger churn ratios than in the Spanish case 
(around 8 and 7 respectively, considering OTC and exchange based 
trading) (Ofgem, 2009). Their exchanges perform quite more effi-
ciently than OMIP, as liquidity exists for all maturities regarding 
electricity base load products and the other derivatives traded (gas, 
C02 and coal (EEX)). In Nasdaq OMX Commodities, some liquidity 
Table 2 
Evolution of traded volumes in OMIP, CESUR auctions, OTC and demand (TWh). 
Sources: OMIP-OMIClear (2011), MEFF (2011), CESUR (2011), Intermoney (2012) 
and REE (2012). 
Data in TWh 
OMIP auctions 
OMIP continuous 
CESUR auctions 
Total OTC 
OTC registered at OMIClear 
OTC registered at MEFF Power 
Spanish mainland demand at 
busbar 
Year 
2011 
1.32 
32.87 
35.31 
298.20 
27.08 
3.76 
255.18 
Year 
2010 
0.59 
25.19 
27.27 
278.84 
29.46 
-
260.61 
July 2006-December 
2011 
57.22 
83.79 
191.26 
863.47 
89.74 
3.76 
1423.44 
Table 3 
Correlation coefficients between OMIP continuous traded volumes and 
monthly evolution of key trading drivers. 
Sources: OMIP-OMIClear (2011) adapted by authors. 
the 
Correlation between OMIP continuous volumes and: 
OTC volumes 
OMIP market makers 
OMIP financial agents 
OMIP vertically integrated generation companies 
OMIClear OTC registered volumes 
Correlation factor 
0.88 
0.82 
0.80 
0.76 
0.70 
exists for electricity contract for differences hedging the price risk of 
the Nordic price areas. In EEX, liquidity of peak futures is well 
developed, and there are also off-peak contracts, though their 
liquidity is small. Additionally those markets have a much wider 
range of trading members, with participation of many municipalities 
and large industrial consumers, balancing the participants' structure 
and theoretically providing more robust price signals (EEX, 2012b; 
NASDAQ OMX Commodities, 2012). 
4. Evolution of the hedging efficiency 
4.1. The measurement of speculation through volume and open 
interest 
Lucia and Pardo (2008) measure the speculative and hedging 
activities in futures markets from volume and open interest data. 
The open interest equals the number of outstanding long posi-
tions (or equivalently, short positions) at the end of the day. The 
open interest increases whenever none of the counterparties 
involved in a trade is closing out a position and decreases when 
both parties are closing out a position. It remains the same when 
only one trader is closing out a position, being this trader replaced 
by another one. The daily trading volume reflects movements in 
the speculative activity. The daily open interest captures hedging 
activities as it excludes all intraday positions taken by day traders, 
mainly inspired by speculative reasons. Hedgers tend to hold their 
forward positions longer than speculators. 
4.2. Evolution of the open interest versus cleared volumes in clearing 
houses 
OMIP-OMIClear and MEFF Power final open interest—i.e. the 
value published for the last trading session of a given contract—are 
studied considering the evolution of the cleared volumes per 
delivery month. Only month contracts of the Spanish zone are 
analysed. The accumulated cleared volume considers, for each 
delivery month, the whole cleared volume of the month contract, 
and the corresponding fractions from the contracts with larger 
maturity (i.e. the quarter and year contracts containing that month 
within their delivery periods). In the case of OMIP-OMIClear, base 
load and peak futures are considered. For MEFF Power, base load 
swaps are considered, as registration of futures contracts has not 
happened yet. The division of the final open interest and the 
accumulated cleared volume is used as a hedging ratio to measure 
the potential interest of the traders in these contracts for risk 
management (hedging by means of final open positions and 
analogous positions established later in the underlying spot market). 
Fig. 3 shows the evolution of the final open interest for each 
month derivative divided by the total cleared volumes of the 
derivatives with delivery in that month. 
Until July 2008, the hedging ratio of the base load futures contracts 
fluctuates in a narrow spread (0.7-1.0) as the final open interest is 
almost equal to the compulsory auction volumes. Afterwards, the 
Table 4 
Comparison of the Iberian power futures market with the most developed European energy derivatives exchanges. 
Sources: OMIP-OMIClear (2011), Nasdaq OMX Commodities (2011, 2012) and EEX (2012b), adapted by authors. 
Traded volumes (TWh) 
OTC registered volumes (TWh) 
Total cleared volumes (TWh) 
Number of participants 
OMIP-OMIClear 
Year 2011 
34.2 
27.1 
61.3 
38 
Year 2010 
25.8 
29.5 
55.2 
32 
Nasdaq OMX Commodities 
Year 2011 
1028.2 
695.1 
1723.3 
356 
Year 2010 
1286.7 
803.1 
2089.8 
361 
EEX 
Year 2011 
498.6 
576.8 
1075.4 
172 
Year 2010 
496.4 
711.9 
1208.3 
157 
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Fig. 3. Evolution of OMIClear and MEFF Power final open interest divided by the total cleared volumes per delivery month for derivatives of the Spanish zone. 
Source: OMIP-OMIClear (2011) and MEFF (2011) adapted by authors. 
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Fig. 4. Evolution of the ex-post forward risk premia in the Iberian energy derivatives exchange and in CESUR auctions. 
Source: OMIP-OMIClear (2011), CESUR (2011), and OMIE (2011) adapted by authors. 
auction volumes become smaller but the continuous volumes and the 
OTC registered volumes in OMIP-OMIClear grow, as shown in Fig. 2. 
Therefore the hedging ratio diminishes and oscillates since the 
beginning of year 2009 in a wider spread (0.1-0.5). In the case of 
peak futures, the series is composed of few values, as there are only 
cleared volumes for the months February 2010-August 2010, and 
June 2011-July 2011. The hedging ratio of the peak futures fluctuates 
in a narrow spread (0.7-1.0) as almost all the transactions correspond 
to hedges performed by the Portuguese last resort supplier in 
auctions for the purchase of regulatorily fixed amounts. Nevertheless, 
the maximum ratios (1.0) in June 2011 and July 2011 correspond to 
single OTC registered transactions of those month contracts, due to 
scarce negotiation of such peak contracts. In the case of base load 
swaps cleared in MEFF Power, the ratio decreases due to bigger 
registration of volumes, as shown in Fig. 2. The series begins in June 
2011, as it is the first month swap with OTC registered volumes. The 
months of July and August 2011 present the maximum ratio (1.0) due 
to low negotiation of those contracts. 
5. Evolution of the price efficiency 
The price efficiency is tracked through the ex-post forward risk 
premium, obtained as the difference of the average forward price 
during the quotation period of the contract and the resulting average 
spot price during the delivery period (see e.g. Redl et al., 2009; 
Table 5 
Economic impact of the electricity purchased by the Spanish last resort suppliers in CESUR auctions. 
Source: CESUR (2011) and OMIE (2011) adapted by authors. 
Auction Product Type Capacity (MW) Energy (MWh) Auction price (e/MWh) Spot price (e/MWh) Premium (e/MWh) Economic impact (e) 
ith 
Oth 
1th 
2th 
3th 
4th 
5th 
6th 
Q3-09 
Q4-09 
Ql-10 
Q2-10 
Q3-10 
Q4-10 
Ql-11 
Q2-11 
Q3-11 
Q4-11 
base load 
peak 
base load 
peak 
base load 
peak 
base load 
peak 
base load 
peak 
base load 
peak 
base load 
peak 
base load 
peak 
base load 
peak 
base load 
peak 
4800 
670 
5000 
670 
4800 
540 
4800 
600 
4000 
536 
4000 
392 
4000 
306 
4000 
406 
3600 
688 
3800 
458 
Total (MWh & e), Weighted Average (e/MWh) 
10,598,400 
530,640 
11,045,000 
530,640 
10,363,200 
414,720 
10,483,200 
468,000 
8,832,000 
424,512 
8,836,000 
310,464 
8,636,000 
235,008 
8,736,000 
316,680 
7,948,800 
544,896 
8,394,200 
357,240 
98,005,600 
42.00 
47.60 
45.67 
51.31 
39.43 
43.70 
40.49 
44.52 
44.50 
50.48 
46.94 
53.00 
49.07 
53.99 
51.79 
55.13 
53.20 
56.63 
57.99 
63.00 
46.83 
35.05 
38.55 
32.87 
36.72 
25.38 
29.99 
34.97 
39.20 
44.07 
49.01 
43.33 
48.22 
45.22 
48.66 
48.12 
51.25 
54.23 
58.62 
52.01 
58.58 
40.83 
6.95 
9.05 
12.80 
14.59 
14.05 
13.71 
5.52 
5.32 
0.43 
1.47 
3.61 
4.78 
3.85 
5.33 
3.67 
3.88 
-1 .03 
-1 .99 
5.98 
4.42 
5.99 
73,658,880 
4,802,292 
141,376,000 
7,742,038 
145,602,960 
5,685,811 
57,867,264 
2,489,760 
3,797,760 
624,033 
31,897,960 
1,484,018 
33,248,600 
1,252,593 
32,061,120 
1,228,718 
-8,187,264 
-1,084,343 
50,197,316 
1,579,001 
587,324,516 
Capitan Herraiz and Rodriguez Monroy, 2009; Furio and Meneu, 
2010; Villaplana and Cartea, 2011). Redl and Bunn (2011) find, 
through analysis of forward and spot data in the German power 
market (EEX), that the forward risk premium in electricity is a 
function of fundamental, behavioural, dynamic, market conduct and 
shock components. This premium is influenced by the gas prices, the 
oil price volatility, the generators' market power and the power 
scarcity. They suggest to use this premium as a market monitor-
ing indicator as higher premium could be caused by market 
concentration. 
5.2. Comparison of the ex-post forward risk premia in the Iberian 
power futures market and the CESUR auctions 
Fig. 4 shows the evolution of the ex-post forward risk premium in 
OMIP and in the CESUR auctions. For OMIP prices, the average 
settlement price of the prompt quarter base load futures contract in 
its last month of quotation is employed. The CESUR price corresponds 
to the equilibrium price of the prompt quarter base load forward 
contract in the auction celebrated immediately before its delivery. 
The price efficiency has improved with the development of the 
futures market, as the forward risk premia evolve towards smaller 
values. However, positive values tend to dominate. Capitan 
Herraiz and Rodriguez Monroy (2010) find that the analysis of 
OMIP forward risk premia (data from July 2006 to February 2010) 
shows differences per contract maturity, allowing arbitrage gains 
through combined trading of month, quarter and year futures 
contracts. Arbitrage opportunities also arise between OMIP and 
CESUR due to the differences in their equivalent premia. The large 
positive premia during 2009 and the first quarter of 2010 are 
caused by rising forward prices and decreasing spot prices in the 
Iberian energy market. The former were pushed up by uncertainty 
in global financial markets, tight credit conditions and price 
increases in energy commodity prices. The latter were decreased 
by the depressed economic situation and low prices in the power 
pool with reduced demand and strong penetration of renewables. 
The smaller spot prices were also influenced by large rainfalls and 
the effect of gas take-or-pay contracts (Alba Rios and Moreda 
Diaz, 2010). 
The positive forward risk premia in CESUR auctions are usually 
bigger than in OMIP. The smaller premia during year 2011 are 
influenced by new regulation—the mechanism solving restric-
tions for security of supply described in Section 2—affecting the 
spot price formation and accordingly the forward price levels. 
5.2. Economic impact of CESUR auctions in the energy cost of the last 
resort supply rates 
Table 5 shows the economic impact on the energy costs of the 
last resort supply rates—based on CESUR equilibrium prices—due 
to frequent positive forward risk premium both in base load and 
peak products. The data span from the 9th auction (celebrated in 
June 2009) until the 16th (in September 2011). 
The purchase of the Spanish last resort suppliers in CESUR 
auctions, with delivery until the end of year 2011, has resulted 
587 million € more expensive the same amount of electricity 
valued at the spot price, due to the dominant positive forward 
risk premium. The only delivery period with negative premium is 
the third quarter of 2011, resulting in a saving of 9.3 million € 
compared to the spot price valuation. 
6. Energy policy considerations 
The following recommendations are drawn from the facts 
exposed in Section 2, and the results of the analyses done in 
Sections 3-5 with the aim of increasing the efficiency of the 
Iberian power futures market. 
6.2. The need for increased post-trade transparency from the power 
futures market operator 
OMIP-OMIClear has published quarterly bulletins with basic 
statistics until the end of 2009. For the sake of post-trade transpar-
ency, its market surveillance department could publish monthly 
reports analysing key oversight and liquidity indicators. Such market 
monitoring reports could aggregate statistics of the volumes traded 
for different groups of trading members (e.g. financial agents, 
companies belonging to Iberian integrated energy groups—i.e. the 
traditional "incumbents"—energy companies not belonging to such 
incumbents, and even market makers) to show which are the most 
active members. Indication of the number of active companies 
effectively trading would indicate how dynamic this market is. 
Concentration indexes (e.g. Herfindahl-Hirschman index "HHI"6) 
would provide worthy information. Valid references for this kind of 
monitoring reports are Nasdaq OMX Commodities monthly reports, 
and EEX market monitoring semiannual reports (NASDAQ OMX 
Commodities, 2012; EEX, 2011). 
OMIP-OMIClear could provide more transparency regarding 
the net positions of OMIP trading members by including open 
interest statistics per different traders' categories in the suggested 
monthly market monitoring report. A good reference is provided 
by the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), in its 
disaggregated "Commitments of Traders" (COT) weekly report, 
showing a breakdown of each Tuesday's open interest for markets 
in which 20 or more traders hold positions equal or above the 
reporting levels established by CFTC. The 2 categories of the 
legacy (i.e. basic) COT reports are very indicative: commercial 
(hedgers) and non-commercial (speculators). For each category, 
the COT report shows long and short positions, changes from 
previous report, percentages of open interest, numbers of traders, 
and concentration of positions held by the largest four and eight 
traders (CFTC, 2011). Another worthy structure could be the one 
provided by the Administrator of CESUR auctions, as it indicates 
the CESUR matched amounts for 3 separated agents' types: 
(i) companies owning power plants in Spain; (ii) companies 
headquartered in Spain; and (iii) integrated business groups 
owning a last resort supplier (OMEL, 2011). 
6.2. The necessity for trade repositories for a comprehensive 
oversight by regulators 
The bulk of the Iberian power forward trading is OTC not 
cleared through a central counterparty. Therefore, the analysis in 
Section 4 only provides a partial snapshot of the hedging activities 
of the market participants (e.g. the agents can close their open 
positions registered in clearing houses through other trades 
established OTC or through other market mechanisms, e.g. CESUR 
auctions). In order to have a full picture of the market, enabling 
the national regulatory authorities to perform a comprehensive 
oversight, all the energy transactions would have to be reported 
to such authorities. Current European legislative initiatives, 
shown in Table 6, are pointing out in that direction. 
The Regulation on wholesale energy market integrity and 
transparency (REMIT) entered in force on December 28, 2011, 
prohibiting insider trading and market manipulation practices in 
the European wholesale electricity and natural gas markets 
(European Union, 2011). The increase in existing transparency 
levels will produce more competitive and liquid markets, redu-
cing costs to market players and on end-users' supplies (Gensler, 
2012). Discussion among all the stakeholders is desired for the 
proper implementation of these legislative pieces, in order to 
prevent troublesome overlapping and flaws in this regulatory 
orchestration, providing more trading confidence to the partici-
pants and a sound supervisory framework for the authorities 
involved. REMIT envisages transaction reporting and inclusion of 
trading orders. The definition of the reporting mechanism is 
currently under development by the European Commission. This 
can take up to 18 months (ACER, 2011b). Such a mechanism 
should include non-standardised contracts (e.g. reporting could 
be done every time the price varies according to an indexation 
formula or once providing the details of such formula) and the 
orders from the opaque OTC trading to avoid supervisory gaps. 
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 As in CNE (2011b), the "HHI" index is built as the sum of squares of the 
market shares considering all the market players. Therefore, it ranges between 0 
(perfect competition) and 10000 (monopoly). CRE (2012) states that concentration 
is small with values lower than 1000 and large with values higher than 1800. 
The reporting of bilateral contracts—e.g. standard contracts as 
those defined through the European Federation of Energy Traders 
(EFET) templates-would contribute to price discovery of intra-
group transactions. The access to all the OTC data will help to 
prevent excessive speculation impacting on the prices (Chilton, 
2012). 
Despite of long lead times for the implementation of the 
European legislative pieces cited above, national energy regula-
tors can also access to OTC data by own initiative, if stated in their 
national law. This is the case of the Spanish Energy Commission 
(CNE). As stated in CNE (2011a), this regulator has access to 
limited information over OTC power transactions (volumes and 
transaction prices, through the information voluntarily submitted 
by the main brokers). On March 5, 2011, the Law of Sustainable 
Economy was published in the Spanish Official Gazette. The 5th 
final disposition of this Law modifies the Securities Market Law, 
enabling the information exchange between CNMV (the Spanish 
Financial Services Authority empowered to request OTC power 
data in the Spanish financial market) and the remaining entities 
composing the MIBEL Regulatory Council7. Those entities signed 
on May 17, 2011, a Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) for the efficient coordination in the MIBEL supervision, 
facilitating the OTC data collection and supervision. On the other 
hand, the Royal Decree-Law 13/2012, of March 30, transposes the 
Directives for the internal electricity and gas markets, i.e. Direc-
tive 2009/72/EC and Directive 2009/73/EC (MINETUR, 2012b; 
European Commission, 2009a, 2009b). These two Directives 
together with other three Regulations constitute the third legis-
lative package for an internal EU gas and electricity market (ACER, 
2011a). That Royal Decree-Law modifies the Law of the Electricity 
Sector (Law 54/1997, of November 27) allowing the Ministry of 
Industry, the CNE, the Spanish Competition Authority and the 
European Commission to access during at least 5 years to the data 
of all the transactions of electricity supply contracts as well as 
electricity derivatives concluded with wholesale customers and 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs). Likewise, this Royal 
Decree-Law modifies the Law of the Hydrocarbons Sector (Law 
34/1998, of October 7) allowing the same aforementioned autho-
rities to access during at least 5 years to the data of all the 
transactions of gas supply contracts as well as gas derivatives 
concluded with wholesale customers and TSOs, the underground 
storage system operators, and the Liquefied Natural Gas system 
operators. 
7. Conclusions 
The traded volumes in the continuous market of the Iberian 
Energy Derivatives Market—the power futures market managed 
by OMIP—grow steadily since its start on July 3, 2006. They are 
correlated to the OTC volumes, the amount of active market 
makers in OMIP, the enrolment in OMIP of financial agents and 
generation companies of vertically integrated groups, and the OTC 
cleared volumes by OMIP clearing house (OMIClear). 
The hedging performance in the Iberian Forward Electricity 
Market is estimated with aggregated data from the Portuguese 
and Spanish clearing houses (OMIClear and MEFF Power respec-
tively) through the ratio of the final open interest of a month 
derivatives contract divided by the accumulated cleared volume 
for that delivery month. OMIP Spanish base load power futures 
contracts show the lowest hedging ratios due to good liquidity. 
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 MIBEL stands for "Mercado Iberico de Electricidad" (Iberian Electricity 
Market). The MIBEL Regulatory Council is composed of CNE, CNMV, ERSE 
(Portuguese National Regulatory Authority) and CMVM (Portuguese Financial 
Services Authority). 
Table 6 
Main European legislative pieces impacting on energy derivatives trading. 
Sources: European Union (2011, 2012) and European Commission (2011a, 2011b, 2011c). 
Legislative Published Scope 
piece on: 
REMIT 
MiFIR 
MiFID I] 
MAR 
EMIR 
Dec. 8, 
2011 
Oct. 20. 
2011 
Oct. 20, 
2011 
Oct. 20, 
2011 
Jul. 27, 
2012 
Regulation on wholesale energy market integrity and 
transparency 
Draft regulation on markets in financial instruments and 
amending EMIR 
Draft reviewed directive on markets in financial instruments 
Draft regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation 
(Market Abuse) 
Regulation on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and 
trade repositories 
A larger data set is required to draw robust conclusions for the 
base load swaps registered in MEFF Power. So far both clearing 
houses behave complementarity, being OMIClear preferred for 
larger maturity contracts cleared as futures. As the registration of 
short maturity contracts is becoming more frequent—daily and 
weekly contracts—further research could analyse if the hedging 
ratios of those contracts are bigger, responding to hedging needs 
close to the delivery period, or smaller as they could be used to 
close positions from month contracts, either to adjust hedging 
needs according to physical delivery commitments or to exploit 
price differences between maturities (arbitrage gains). The hed-
ging ratio has limitations due to a couple of reasons. First, it 
provides a trading partial snapshot, as the majority of the OTC 
trading is not centrally cleared and no aggregated data are 
published. Second, the hedge only exists if the trader does a 
similar operation in the spot market. Nevertheless, it can be very 
useful for energy regulators performing market oversight once 
they access to the details of all the transactions of energy 
derivatives according to the EU Regulation on Energy Market 
Integrity and Transparency ("REMIT"). 
The ex-post forward risk premium, obtained as the difference 
of the average forward price during the trading period and the 
underlying spot price during the delivery period, has diminished 
due to the agents' learning curve and the effect of the fixed price 
retributing the indigenous coal fired generation. As a result of 
frequent positive forward risk premia, the electricity purchase by 
the Spanish last resort suppliers in CESUR auctions, with delivery 
between July 2009 and December 2011, has resulted 587 mil-
lion € more expensive than the electricity cost valued at the spot 
price. Analysis of the economic impact of the contract for 
differences mechanism defined in Royal Decree 302/2011 is 
suggested for additional research. This mechanism helps to 
mitigate the tariff deficit caused by regulated prices for special 
regime generation. 
Further research, based on literature review about regulatory 
risk, is suggested to quantify the increase in the Iberian forward 
risk premium due to regulatory risk provoked by intensive 
introduction of policy measures in Spain and Portugal with urgent 
nature. Due to time pressure, such measures may lack a robust 
cost-benefit analysis. The balance between the benefits and cost 
of imperfect regulation should overcome the costs of the related 
market failures. The outcomes of the suggested potential research 
could be very useful for energy regulators streamlining the 
existing regulation and supervising the performance of the 
wholesale energy markets. 
Finally, despite of the dynamic trading environment, the 
Iberian Energy Derivatives Market is still much less developed 
than the European leaders (Nasdaq OMX Commodities and EEX). 
Its overall efficiency could increase with wider enrolment—there 
is still much room for international energy companies, financial 
agents, energy intensive industries and renewable generation 
companies-, post-trade transparency actions through market 
operator's monthly oversight reports, and stronger supervision 
of regulators through integral data access from all trading venues. 
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